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Abstract: Our approach aims to emphasize the role that the institutional legacy of the past has in generating 
institutional blockages in transition countries (including Romania), while advancing several courses of action in 
order to overcome the difficulties found in the socio-economic frameworks. We believe that the success of the 
transition to capitalism equals most often with a institutional reconfiguration supported by the participation and 
active involvement of civil society.  
 
Keywords: institution; performance; legal system. 
JEL Classification: E02; K4.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The legacy of the past (the path dependency of a post-communist country involved in the transition 
towards market economy) is an issue that should not be neglected, as it often generates distorted formal 
and informal institutions, which alter economic performance to date. 
The complexity of the transformations that took place in Central and Eastern Europe after the 
collapse of communist regimes, had some defining characteristics formed by the interaction of these 
mutations  with  the  Western-European  mainstream,  defined  by  capitalism  (in  economic  terms)  and 
democracy (in political terms); such transformations were found in all the spheres of life of individuals 
– ideology, economy, politics and social order; they were not generated by wars or military requirements, 
but they were adopted at a fast pace within the institutional frameworks. 
Success of the transition to capitalism depended largely on the extent to which the adequate 
institutions were present; ultimately, the established theory of transition is equivalent to a theory of 
institutional change, which deals with the redesign and reconfiguration of institutions in the countries 
who once owned a centralized economy (Raiser, 1997).  
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1. PATH DEPENDENCE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAILTY 
 
By  using  economic  and  geographic  variables  (initial  level  of  development,  urbanization, 
unbalanced distribution of industries, governmental intervention over trade mechanisms paralleled by 
black market operations), some authors establish a direct link between the initial conditions found in the 
states  with  a  planned  economy  and  economic  performance  (De  Melo,  1997).  This  interrelation  is 
investigated amid the analysis of a key institutional variable – the market imprint, representing the 
number of years spent under a centralized-economy regime. 
Other studies establish baseline conditions as determinants of economic performance, in a number 
of 25 countries (including Romania), using certain variables of institutional development – reform index 
and  state  capture  index  (Fisher  and  Sahay,  2004).  The  reform  index  requires  the  quantitative 
determination of institutional changes and adopted reforms, and it is calculated as the average of the 
indices of liberalization and financial and market reforms. State capture index measures the proportion 
in which businesses in general are subdued by a ruling system of private interests (Helmann, 2000).  
If some of the contributions in the literature have been concerned with establishing a causal link 
between initial conditions and institutional change, as the hard core of the alleged transition reforms, 
others have been interested in establishing the optimal rate at which these changes should occur (Aghion 
and Blanchard, 1994). Executive role is valued here as a prerequisite for establishing a rhythm of 
transition from gradual to sudden (a big-bang type), where two approaches emerge: shock therapy and 
gradualism (Roland, 2000). In this respect, the shock therapy proponents propose changes made at a fast 
pace, to eliminate the risks of gradualism and individual resistance to change, while those who support a 
gradual approach rely on a reduction in transition costs related to generating high rates of unemployment. 
Another category of concerns focuses on determining how institutional change will alter the path-
dependent formal and informal institutions that may not be in harmony with the new socio-economic 
order.  
For some authors, planned economy has had an impact on society as a whole, by promoting a 
climate of distrust both among individuals and between them and the state per se (Rose and Mishler, 
1997). For others, paradoxically, the imperfections of the state economy have had a beneficial social 
effect, leading to the creation of a second economy (a parallel economy,  yet bearing the seeds of CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 1 
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capitalism) with its own regularities and institutions, ready to assist the transition towards a competitive-
market climate (Stark, 1997). We are tributary to the first view point, although we acknowledge the 
existence of a second economy with its own regularities, formed during the communist age, characterized 
by multiple failures that disrupted the interaction with the market forces (the high incidence of bribery 
offences in awarding public-procurement contracts). For example, the business ties established between 
the  communist  elites  remained  internalized  by  the  state  capture  paradigm,  thus  removing  open 
competition and fostering a general distrust in state institutions, regarded as unable to dismiss such 
behaviours. 
We are witnessing the continued presence of anachronistic behaviours for economic performance 
(as informal institutions), derived from the legacy of a generalized, resistant-to-change mistrust. The 
phenomenon can be explained if we consider that certain aspects are difficult to change only within 
formal institutions (legislative), hence a typical case of lack of harmony between formal and informal 
institutions (Elster, 1998). The aspects that remain difficult to change are: cultural patterns, identity crisis, 
path-dependent informal institutions, the various behaviours that inhibit or promote the adoption of 
solutions to the problems that society, as a whole, is facing, as well as the vigour with which the 
incentives for entrepreneurship and economic performance are initiated. 
The lack of harmony between the two institutions has led to the proliferation of opportunistic 
individual behaviours that are detrimental to overall economic performance and social conduct rules – 
tax evasion, corruption, bribery, organized crime, theft of public property assets, components of an 
underground economy.  
  
2. THE REFORM OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Reforming institutional  arrangements  is  the only  way to  stimulate economic performance by 
considering both formal and informal institutions, as well as their interaction (Raiser, 1999). Thus, the 
reform paradigm of institutional arrangements is structured around a series of informal (moral norms, 
trustworthiness and the way these values are imposed by the civil society) and formal institutions 
(governance, rules, laws, regulations). CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 1 
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The existence and propagation of such institutions are under the impact of historical, ideological, 
technological  exogenous  variables.  Technology  and  preferences  are  important  to  institutional 
arrangements in that, as North (1981) postulated, they determine the level of costs and benefits resulting 
from the compliance with the set of formal and informal institutions, through the process of social and 
economic interactions between given actors. 
From a dynamic perspective, we can say that social morality is influenced by ideology, history 
(e.g. the influence of Ottoman institutions on Romanian social life has resulted in the manifestation of a 
so-called  Balkan  behaviour)  and  leadership  (the  degree  to  which  society  adheres  to  the  idea  of 
institutional change). The presence of moral norms in a society (generalized or specific to certain 
structured groups, according to certain criteria) is associated most often with civil society involvement 
(media, churches, etc.), that supports and catalyses the manifestation of individual moral tendencies. In 
its turn, this leads towards social harmony, by increasing trustworthiness between economic actors as a 
prerequisite for trade facilitation, even under the circumstance of imperfect information – a feature of 
modern societies. 
But ideology and history, along with social norms, may influence the effectiveness of governance, 
i.e. its active manifestation as a system of laws and regulations that punish disruptive behaviours and 
value constructive ones.  
Seldom are the cases in which a society based on honesty, solidarity, decency, simplicity (i.e. moral 
norms that are scarcely found in the Romanian society) culminates by having an aggressive, wasteful, 
dishonest government that encourages state servitude to private interests. In contrast, the prevalence of 
particularism,  individualism,  formally  or  informally  unsanctioned  opportunism,  represents  a  fertile 
ground for such a government (i.e. a more than familiar Romanian scenario). The type of governance 
will influence the adoption and effective implementation of a set of rules and regulations that will 
structure the socio-economic interactions and potential economic trade. 
In our opinion, governmental leadership plays an important role in institutional change, as it acts 
as an interface between government and society; it also indicates the pulse of civil society and its effective 
involvement in the proposed formal changes, thus ensuring future harmony (convergence) between the 
newly introduced formal institutions (whether imported or not) and the existing informal infrastructure. CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 1 
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Of course, the existence of such a mechanism is a matter of political will, if political leaders 
understand to engage in a dialogue with their society members. The reward will match the efforts – 
society will gain trust in political actions. Only then can we talk about a high complementarity between 
the level of trust (social capital) and government effectiveness. 
When trust in government is low, the society's pressures on officials to promote measures that 
stimulate economic performance are also low (such an approach is viewed as lacking purpose, as those 
in charge of governing are only there to preserve their acquired power status). Poor governance leads to 
poor performance, reducing society's trust in the political factor. 
Given  the  foregoing  considerations,  we  consider  that  the  institutional  change  conducive  to 
promoting economic performance (in general, and Romania, in particular) can occur in various situations. 
Firstly, the modification of institutional arrangements may occur due to the impact of exogenous 
variables. E.U.'s post-accession pressures and its recommendations for the strengthening of jurisdictional 
capacity and elimination of corruption are a good example of this. 
Secondly, institutional evolution can be under the impact of mutations happening in the political 
sphere, i.e. changes in the ideology and / or leadership, or in the economic sphere, i.e. the evolution of 
preferences, the (discontinuous) technical and technological progress. 
The government may adopt effective laws and regulations, while ensuring an optimal infrastructure 
for  their  de  facto  implementation.  Changes  can  be  promoted  more  or  less  voluntarily  (E.U. 
recommendations), even if they harm the existing power status (state capture). 
Also, the political factor may adopt measures likely to reduce the possibility of the arbitrary actions 
of public organizations through institutional restriction of their power and effective control over decision-
making processes. 
Eliminating corruption (as an informal institution) may occur as a result of shifting the decision-
making responsibilities towards other institutional levels, strengthening the organizations responsible for 
fighting corruption (Romanian National Anti-Corruption Department) or increasing the salary level of 
the  state  apparatus  to  ensure  a  decent  standard  of  living  and  eliminate  propensity  towards  crimes 
consisting in bribery, undue acquisition, influence peddling etc.  
Such actions must coincide with the initiation of a participatory dialogue with the civil society that 
will ensure the latter's agreement with the proposed institutional changes. Even if we are in the presence CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 1 
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of a low credibility level in the executive, legislative and judicial powers, the best way to increase their 
credibility is to demonstrate a high determination in adopting institutional reforms designed to stimulate 
overall economic performance. 
We believe that, at least initially, the adoption of strategic alternatives may underlie the valuation 
of  existing  formal  institutions  and  increase  their  predictability,  through  legislative  stability.  Their 
modification  can  only  be  achieved  gradually,  in  parallel  with  the  evolution  of  specific  informal 
institutions,  to  promote harmony  and avoid  frictions  in  the structure  of institutional  arrangements. 
However, such a strategy should be relaxed, if we consider E.U.'s claims of de facto institutional changes, 
not de jure. The costs of failing to rapidly adopt these normative changes, in this case, could exceed the 
costs of virtual friction between formal and informal institutions. 
An  alternative  strategy  involves  sudden  institutional  changes  of  normative  and  judicial 
frameworks, to comply with the new requirements supporting economic performance; this strategic 
decision is relatively risky in terms of the formal-informal relationship. This strategic choice is not 
exactly new, as Lipton and Sachs (1990) were the first who valued the specificity of this course of action. 
In these circumstances, the costs of introducing and maintaining the new de facto formal institutions will 
be high at first, keeping the same trend for a good period of time, given the lack of convergence with the 
existing informal institutions. Costs will be higher if we consider that the new formal institutions may 
require other (secondary) formal institutions in order to help them become effective and efficient, thus 
the formal institutional system becoming lusher. From the social point of view, we can expect the 
possibility of an institutional reluctance to coercion (coercion being the method that ensures institutional 
implants, amid the resistance to change of existing informal institutions). 
Another strategic alternative to institutional change is subsumed to political feasibility, revolving 
around the adoption of reforms in formal institutional frameworks, characterized by low implementation 
costs, due to the simplicity of the new institutions or the existence of an average convergence with the 
informal ones. For example, in Romania, progress was faster in areas that have not required extensive 
institutional changes in the design or conduct of public and private actors – price and trade liberalization, 
small-scale privatization. Things were different when the privatization and restructuring of large public 
enterprises were imposed, along with the regulatory reform in the areas of competition, finance and law 
(EBRD Transition Report, 1997). CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 1 
  48 
The main drawback of this approach is that at some point reform no longer multiplies itself in the 
institutional sphere which is the most important for economic performance (also due to state capture and 
opposition of the bureaucratic network that internalizes the benefits of political and economic power 
status, thanks to corruption, arbitrariness etc.); ultimately, the change lacks depth. 
In our opinion, a feasible strategy to promote institutional change is the one that considers this 
process as having a dual determination: exogenous and endogenous. From an endogenous perspective, 
the process of institutional development can be viewed as Darwinian, as institutions adapt and are being 
influenced (in a one-way relationship) by human behaviour on which there is a wide range of temporary 
contextual constraints (Tridico, 2004). Thus, we have shown during our research that technological 
changes may cause changes in the formal and informal institutional context, which in its turn transforms 
the actors' behaviours and habits. Also, redesigning formal institutions may alter the formal framework; 
this phenomenon transposes an evolution of behaviour and habits of the actors, which in turn changes 
the informal paradigm; the latter subsequently reconfigures the formal paradigm. At another level, 
developments  registered  in  the  transformation  of  social  values  determine  behaviour  and  habit 
evolutionism, whose status carries a mutation within society's institutional arrangements (formal and 
informal). 
The character of change can shift from an incremental to a discontinuous one, catalysed by radical 
changes, wars, revolutions, dictatorship or by the promotion of harsh sanctioning measures, as the state's 
response to the breach of the prearranged conduct of formal institutions. 
However, formal institutions do not generate the immediate change of informal ones (as true as the 
reverse), given that they require additional time for the new institutions to resonate with individual 
behaviours that, in turn, evolve under the influence of old informal institutions and customs, as inertia 
manifests itself. 
The  idea  according  to  which  technological  changes  matter  only  within  their  institutional 
framework, is also found in the work of Veblen (1961) and Neale (1998). According to the latter, an 
institution cannot exist in isolation, but only as part of an institutional ensemble, and, consequently, a 
change in an institution generates the need for transformation in the others as well, in order to preserve 
the existing interrelations within this whole.  CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 1 
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A  change  in  the  value  system  will  cause  mutations  within  the  spheres  of  attitude  change, 
knowledge, behaviours, habits, but a possible source of institutional change can also be found in the idea 
of reform. 
But institutional change can also be a discontinuous process, intensified by revolutions, radical 
changes and power imbalances, by dramatic changes in the economic and political system. Such changes 
will only reconfigure, at least initially, the formal institutions, not the informal ones. So can we explain 
the discrepancies between de jure and de facto existence of institutions designed to stimulate economic 
performance in Romania – a path-dependent mentality. 
The survival of old informal institutions is virtually responsible for the institutional collision, where 
the  formal  and  informal  diverge,  as  institutional  frameworks  become  characterized  by  a  striking 
inconsistency (in the context of informal inertia and path dependency). The imminence of institutional 
blockage becomes more likely as formal institutions are urged to be implemented, without having 
sufficient time for institutional harmonization. 
Factual evidence in Romania confirms our assertions. Economic performance will not be enhanced 
by introducing, redesigning and importing formal institutions (even if done under the impact of E.U.'s 
post accession recommendations). It will ultimately remain dependent on mentality, on the level of 
confidence in the political factor and in its commitment to reform institutional frameworks.  
As a result, institutional change is not only path-dependent (this concept explains why some 
ineffective institutions continue to survive), but it is also related to the human behaviour's reaction to 
formal change. Given the foregoing arguments, we consider the process of institutional change as being 
a complex one, whose consequences can often be unreliable, inconsistent with the initial objectives of 
those who support reform, largely determined by the legacy of the past, a possible antithesis between the 
formal and the informal, new constraints triggered by old behaviours that characterized the actors / 
organizations of public or private law. 
The task of the institutional-change promoters in Romania becomes more difficult, not necessarily 
from this perspective, but because the evolution of the institutional paradigm has been imprinted with 
some features related to: path dependence, alteration of the state law, lack of interpersonal trust, lack of 
individuals' trust in the ability of the state to impose equitable laws and contracts, de jure introduction of 
formal institutions under the influence of national and international political factors, disregarded by CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 1 
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individuals, de facto operational inefficiency of these institutions which failed to eliminate opportunism 
and  to  decrease  transition  costs,  formal  climate  instability  and  persistence  of  conflicting  statutory 
provisions, the prevalence of diachronic institutional relations which trigger possible discrepancies in the 
process of institutional synchronization. 
From another perspective, the institutional reform can be achieved by promulgating laws and 
regulations that support direct foreign investments. We make this assertion not necessarily thinking that 
FDI bring certain advantages to the economy of the host country, related to improved employment rate, 
capital inflows and so on, but rather highlighting that they bring with them the seeds of capitalism (as a 
lifestyle,  valuing  individual  performance,  removing  private  interests  and  the  mentality  of  socially-
assisted citizens). Moreover, FDI introduce new ways of organizing the technological progress as a 
source – as we have earlier revealed – of formal institutional change and behaviour transformation.  
When the institutional change paradigm will support cooperation between formal and informal 
institutions, by overcoming tensions due to the survival of an archaic mentality, the frailty of economic 
performance will be removed. 
In our opinion, the register of institutional changes should include primarily active measures meant 
to eliminate the negative effects of corruption (informal institution), in order to overcome a possible 
institutional blockage, given that recent studies show Romanians' low level of confidence in the legal 
effectiveness  of  regulations  and  public  organizations  designed  to  restrict  the  effects  of  pervasive 
corruption, considering that this phenomenon is the main problem that society is currently facing. 
Moreover, the vast majority of people participating in the conduct of these studies believes that this 
informal institution underwent a resurgence in recent years, affecting the public health, border protection 
and judicial systems. In this respect, The Global Competitiveness Report for 2011-2012, identified 
corruption as the fifth largest obstacle for the Romanian business environment. Therefore, we believe 
that economic performance will be boosted by the resolution of such issues which have been found in 
Romania for a long time (perhaps due to the informal institutional heritage of Ottoman or Tsarist 
origins?). 
We believe that in the eradication of such phenomena, not only the state (through its normative 
regulations)  or  the  supranational  bodies  promoting  exogenous    institutional  change  (European CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 1 
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benchmarks) will have an important role, but civil society as a whole as well, as the main actor designed 
to achieve the creative destruction of the Balkan mentality and particularism. 
Ab initio, to highlight the role that civil society plays in eradicating corruption, we should highlight 
the concept of social responsibility, as a civic engagement designating a wide range of actions and 
mechanisms that citizens, communities, the (independent) media and other civil society organizations 
use to obtain a reasonable level of control and transparency for the actions of individuals (those involving 
the exercise of public functions and dignities) and public organizations (adapted from Malena, 2004). 
But in order to have the expected results, the involvement of civil society has to fulfil a number of 
criteria related to the effectiveness of this involvement (Fukuyama, 1995; Rose -Ackerman and Kornai, 
2004; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993; Almond & Verba, 1963). First, the prevalence of honesty and 
integrity, as informally imposed values by the society. Then, the existence of NGOs and a civil society-
engagement tradition in promoting integrity and common values shared by societal frameworks, is 
another prerequisite for structuring behaviours and actions that restrict the manifestation of corruption, 
along with the participation and commitment of the political to work in favour of the community (as part 
of the civic culture). According to recent studies, the effectiveness of civil society is responsible for about 
70% of the level of corruption in a country, while representing an important indicator of a country's 
development level and consistency of government policies (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010). 
Consequently, solving the problem of the persistence of informal institutions that alter economic 
performance would involve primarily a set of measures meant to strengthen the active and effective 
involvement of civil society. Against this background, tangible measures should be taken to eradicate 
corruption, instead of measures that consider this phenomenon in abstracto, as a sine qua non trait 
implied by the transition to capitalism. In fact, this scourge spreads to society due to the specific self-
reproductive effects of the way individuals understand to preserve client￨le, by vitiating the fundamental 
mechanisms of resource allocation and economic performance. 
Designing and implementing an anti-corruption strategy requires the involvement of NGOs and 
the independent media as an infrastructure meant to support the dissemination of information, impact 
and awareness measures among individuals and the social values to defend, including the fact that the 
capitalist doctrine requires, in Romania, first and foremost, a mind-set change related to the exclusion of 
client￨le and private interests from socio-economic interactions.    CES Working Papers – Volume VI, Issue 1 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The lack of convergence between formal and informal institutions has led to the proliferation of 
opportunistic  individual  behaviours  that  are  detrimental  to  the  overall  economic  performance  and 
standards of conduct. The current transition period wears the flaws of the former regime, characterized 
by an institutional vacuum, in which the partial lack of adequate formal institutions that could have 
stimulated economic performance, has been replaced by informal institutions that translate deviant 
economic behaviours and allocate resources and activities to a second (underground) economy. 
Government leadership may play a special role in the process of institutional change, as it could 
act as an interface between society and its government; it could also indicate the pulse of civil society 
and  its  effective  involvement  in  the  proposed  formal  changes,  thus  ensuring  future  harmony 
(convergence) between the newly introduced formal institutions (whether imported or not) and the 
existing informal infrastructure. Addressing the persistence of informal institutions that alter economic 
performance also requires a set of measures designed to strengthen the active and effective involvement 
of civil society. 
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